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Abstract 
 
A vital element of a cyberspace infrastructure is cybersecurity. Many protocols proposed for security issues, 
which leads to anomalies that affect the related infrastructure of cyberspace. Machine learning (ML) 
methods used to mitigate anomalies behavior in mobile devices. This paper aims to apply a High 
Performance Extreme Learning Machine (HP-ELM) to detect possible anomalies in two malware datasets.  
Two widely used datasets (the CTU-13 and Malware) are used to test the effectiveness of HP-ELM. 
Extensive comparisons are carried out in order to validate the effectiveness of the HP-ELM learning method. 
The experiment results demonstrate that the HP-ELM was the highest accuracy of performance of 0.9592 
for the top 3 features with one activation function.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The popularity of smartphones is growing recently. According to the Gartner, the total number of 
smartphone’s user will reach six billion by 2020 ( according to Ericsson  [1] ), also more than 40 million 
attacks by malicious mobile malware ( according to Kaspersky Labs [2] ), and a data breach will exceed 
$150 million by 2020 (according to Juniper research [3]). Smartphone devices are affected by malicious 
malware which installs their modules in the system directory and attempts to subvert the typical system’s 
behavior [4].  
 
To cope with these problems, researchers and security analysts conducted a study for practical or scientific 
purposes to establish reliable applications for mobile devices. In [5], Russon discovered various types of 
hidden malware in more than 104 Google play applications which downloaded over 3.2 million times. It 
causes numerous attacks to user’s mobile devices to affect the CPU loads for the system[5].  
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Several security protocols applied for malware detection. Such systems can be either anomaly-based or 
behavior-based. The former relies on a predefined pattern. This type of Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is 
an efficient approach for identifying sweeps and probes of network hardware and hints early warnings of 
potential intrusions before firing attacks such as Telnet. Such type systems depend on receiving regular 
signature updates (i.e., the extent of the signature database). The dramatic influence of DDoS attacks by 
Mirai bot net and its variants highlights the risks for IoT devices [6]. An end to end security scheme called 
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol utilizes an encryption technique [7]. Although DTLS 
mitigate the specific type of attacks, it fails to identify all type of big data based anomalous behaviors. The 
significant drawback is that they are attack-specific [8]. Therefore, it is essential to develop methodologies 
and procedures to measure the uncertainty of IoT devices and its potential capacity to make a smart decision 
in order to increase the efficiency of security and privacy issue in IoT environments. It is also essential to 
provide smart recommendation in terms of fraud or vulnerability detection using leaning algorithms.  
 
Soft computing techniques such as neuro fuzzy have been proposed to mitigate the security issue in IoT 
based malware detection [9]. Neuro-Fuzzy classifiers trained from static data and data that applications 
generate during their execution. Neuro-Fuzzy has a potential in malware detection based on collected 
statistics and derived fuzzy rules ([10], [11], [12]). Moreover, several learning algorithms have been 
proposed to identify the malware codes and their behaviors and identify the specific type of threats 
([13],[14]). The main drawback of soft computing technique such as neuro fuzzy is that the fuzzy rules are 
randomly generated to tune the weights of the neural network and the number of hidden layers can increase 
depending on the type of application. However, there is no way to speed up the procedure of tuning.  Thus, 
ELM can adjust the activation functions in the Single Hidden Layer Feed-forward Neural Networks 
(SLFNs)  ([15] , [16] , [17])  and [18].  
 
In this paper, we utilized a fast convergent reinforcement solution named High Performance Extreme 
Learning Machine (HP-ELM) to help the learning phase of the method to call the parameters of the hidden 
neurons that created randomly, which is independent of the training data [19]. Furthermore, such a method 
is used to test various scales of data sets, different structure selection options, and regularization methods. 
In our study, HP-ELM is applied to classify the malware in two datasets.  
 
In our study, we deal with the following research questions: 1. “What are the current data analytic techniques 
that are being used to extract meaningful IoT based malware devices values?”,  2. “How to maintain malware 
influence on IoT?” and  3. “What is the effect of the proposed security and privacy preserving framework 
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in terms of scalability in the big data platform?”. Our work contributes to forensic malware behaviour. 
Previous results and datasets of mobile malware applications used in this study ([20] ,[21]).  
The contribution of the paper is to propose an IDS method to recognize IoT malware as follows. 
• We applied a feature selection method in two malware datasets.  
• We developed a malware detection system for IoT environment based on HP-ELM classifier. 
• We tested the efficiency of the proposed system using two benchmark datasets: CTU-13 dataset 
[20] and DyHAP malware dataset [21] and we compared the performance of HP-ELM with and without 
feature selection. 
 
The manuscript organized as follows. The previous works discussed in Section 2. Section 3 presents the 
HP-ELM detection method and Section 4 discusses data preparation. Section 5 presents scenarios and the 
setting of the HP-ELM parameters. Section 6 presents the simulation setup and evaluation metrics — 
experiments presented in Section 7. Section 8 concludes the paper and presents future directions. 
2. Previous work 
 
This section presents technical papers which use the security framework for malware based IoT [22,23]. In 
[22], an application program is tested in a scrutinizing manner without the implementation of the actual 
application (i.e., a reverse engineer process) while in [23], a program investigates the behavior of the running 
processes by executing the application. On the one hand, a static type malware program requires low 
memory resources, minimal CPU processes and the analysis process is fast, on the other hand, a dynamic 
one could be used to detect unknown changes and malware existence  [24]. A machine learning based 
malware detection proposed in [25] which used a private and a public dataset. Finally, they validated their 
solutions in various cases. In our paper, we also evaluated the proposed methods in a private (Andoird 
Malware) and a public (CTU-13) dataset using a different type of HP-ELM parameter setting experiments.  
 
Authors in [24] use a crowdsourcing system in order to attain the flows of the application’s behavior. Many 
studies have been carried out on mobile phone malware based on a single operating system or a comparative 
study between two operating systems. Authors in [22] present a multilevel and behavior-based Android 
malware detection using 125 existing malware families and report 96% detection of malware. However, this 
approach applies system calls which contains less semantic information and is not able to detect malicious 
behavior accurately.  Recently, authors in  [26] captured system calls and “binder transactions” which runs 
the runtime behavior signature. This method presents a new malware variant detection client-server system 
which jointly covers the logic structures and the runtime behaviors of mobile applications for Android 
devices. However, this approach depends on the network status, graph mining; it impacts network 
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performance, which directly influences the computation complexity. Therefore, it is not suitable for real-
time detection.  
In [27]  authors present a lightweight detection system to identify malicious behaviors from mobile devices. 
Statistical Markov chain models applied to build the application behavior in the form of a feature vector and 
the random forest is adopted to classify the application behavior. The results indicate an accuracy of 96%.  
 
Mirai attempts to categorize remarkable DDoS attacks affecting high profile targets [6]. It is a wake-up call 
for the control in IoT devices and analyzes the risk of increasingly DDoS attacks. It diminishes the 
administrative credentials of IoT devices using brute force, relying on a small dictionary of a possible 
username and password pairs [28]. To cope with such issues, we need resource efficiency hybrid IDSs as 
novel security solutions that can efficiently protect devices against DDoS, considering the insufficient 
resources available in the IoT environment.  
 
3. HP-ELM detection method 
 
The main drawback of soft computing technique is that the fuzzy rules are randomly generated to tune the 
weights of the neural network and the number of hidden layers can increase depending on the type of 
application. However, there is no way to speed up the procedure of tuning.  Thus, ELM able adjust the 
activation functions in the single hidden layer feed-forward neural networks (SLFNs)  ([15] , [16] , [17])  
and [18]. 
This section presents the HP-ELM mobile network architecture applied on two malware datasets Android 
Malware [21] and CTU-13 dataset [20]. As mentioned in Figure 1, ELM is fast training method for SLFN 
networks[29].  
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Figure 1. Computing the output of an SLFN (ELM) model 
Figure 1 shows the computing of output of an ELM model. It includes three layers of neurons. There is no 
computation in layer one (input). The input layer weights 𝜔 and biases 𝑏  are set randomly and never 
adjusted (random distribution of the weight). The output layer is linear and there is no transformation 
function and bias for the output-layer. Therefore, the computing time is very fast. The word “ Single” in 
“SLFN” is because there is  only one layer of non-linear neurons (hidden layer). The main advantage of 
ELM is to produce weakly connected hidden layer features, because the input layer weights randomly 
generated, and it improves the generalization properties of the solution of a linear output layer [19].  
The ELM method described as follows. We consider a set of 𝑁 distinct training samples (𝑥𝑖, 𝑡𝑖) , 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑁] 
with 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑅
𝑐   and 𝑡𝑖 ∈ 𝑅
𝑐. A SLFN with 𝐿 hidden neurons has the following output equations: 
∑ 𝛽𝑗∅(𝑤𝑗𝑥𝑖 + 𝑏𝑗),
𝐿
𝑗=1       𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑁], (1) 
where ∅ is the activation function (a sigmoid function is a common choice, but other activation functions 
are possible including linear [17], [18] and [29]),  𝑤𝑗   =  [𝑤𝑗1,𝑤𝑗2,𝑤𝑗𝑛,]
𝑇
 is the weight vector that connects 
the n input nodes to the jth hidden node, 𝑏𝑖 are the biases values of the jth node. 
A hidden node and 𝛽𝑗 = [𝛽𝑗1,𝛽𝑗2,𝛽𝑗𝑚,]
𝑇
   is the set of values of the output weights that connects the jth 
hidden node with m output nodes.  The relation between inputs 𝑥𝑖 of the network, target outputs 𝑡𝑖 and 
estimated outputs 𝑦𝑖  is: 
𝑦𝑖 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗∅(𝑤𝑗𝑥𝑖 + 𝑏𝑗) = 𝑡𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,
𝐿
𝑖=1      𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑁],   (2) 
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h1 h2 hk
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where ∅ is the activation function and 𝑤𝑗 is the weight vector that connects the n input nodes to the jth 
hidden node, 𝑏𝑖the biases values of the jth node. The noise (𝜖) includes both random noise and dependency 
on variables not presented in the inputs 𝑋.   
For N samples, the N equations can be represented as Hβ=T, where 
𝐻 = (𝑤1, 𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝑘 , 𝑏1, 𝑏2, … , 𝑏𝑘 , 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑁)     (3) 
= (
∅(𝑤1. 𝑥1 + 𝑏1) ⋯ ∅(𝑤𝑘. 𝑥1 + 𝑏𝑘)
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
∅(𝑤1. 𝑥𝑁 + 𝑏1) ⋯ ∅(𝑤𝑘. 𝑥𝑁 + 𝑏𝑘)
)
𝑁∗𝑘
   ,  
𝛽 =  [𝛽1
𝑇 … 𝛽𝑘
𝑇]
𝑘∗𝑚
𝑇
         (4) 
𝑇 =  [𝑦1
𝑇 … 𝑦𝑘
𝑇]
𝑁∗𝑚
𝑇
         (5) 
The output weight matrix β is found by solving the least square problem: 
?̇? = 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝛽‖Hβ − T‖ = 𝐻
†𝑇,        (6) 
?̇? =  (𝐻T𝐻)
−1
𝐻𝑇𝑇         (7) 
where 𝐻† is the MP pseudo inverse of the hidden layer output matrix H.  
This paper used HP-ELM toolbox which supports multi-class, weighted multi-class and multi-label as a 
classifier [19]. Section 4 describes how HP-ELM adapted to the two malware scenarios.  
4. Dataset preparation  
In this study, the HP-ELM methods evaluated on two scenarios. The first scenario uses the Mobile Malware 
dataset and the second scenario uses the CTU-13 dataset. We will describe the method of data collection for 
these two scenarios next. 
 
4.1. Mobile Malware dataset (Scenario 1): 
 
This scenario consists of two types of applications such as benign and malware. Twenty normal apk file 
downloaded from Google Play. These benign files installed on an Android-based operating system Jelly 
Bean version 4.3 which runs on mobile devices. After installation, the network traffic of running apps 
captured in a real time network environment in order to authenticate the behavior of apps. In the case of 
malware, the experiment utilizes Malgenome [30] as the malware dataset. It contains 1260 samples which 
consist of 49 malware families used in the previous study [21]. The identification includes several malware 
types, such as a botnet, root exploit, and Trojan. Authors selected seven connection-based features on the 
Information Gain (IG) [31] algorithm to analyze it because of its practical measuring features [32]. IG shows 
their strength in accuracy enhancement, the capability of generalization and short execution time.  It 
determines how the training sets separated according to the target classification [33]. In Scenario 1, the 
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higher gain ratio indicates the feature’s relevance in a classification model for a machine learning classifier. 
Therefore, the features are maximum_frame, frame_STD, count_ACK, Minimum_Dest_Port, 
Average_Frame, and Average_source_port [21] . Figure 2 shows the methodology of collection of mobile 
malware dataset in Scenario 1.  
 
 
Figure 2: The methodology of collection of Mobile Malware data 
 
4.2. CTU-13 dataset (Scenario 2): 
This dataset consists of thirteen captures (called Scenarios) of different real botnet samples [20]. The 
characteristics of the scenarios and the features (pcap files) captured in terms of tcpdump. The pcap files 
are converted to netflow file standard using the argus software suite in two steps. The first step converts the 
pcap files to a bidirectional argus binary storage. The second step converts the argus bin to Netflow. The 
outcome of these steps is the final netflow file [34]. The next step is to assign the label to the netflow data. 
The background label assigns the normal label to the traffic which matches a specific filter. Then the botnet 
label is assigned to the traffic that comes from or to any of the known infected IP address [20]. Figure 3 
indicates the methodology of collection of CTU-13 and how the HP-ELM classifies it.  
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Figure 3: The methodology of collection of CTU-13 
In this research work, the labeled dataset splits into training (70%) and testing data (30%) [35] to evaluate 
with the HP-ELM algorithm. In the next section, we propose the procedure of applying the method to the 
datasets.  
5. Proposed method  
The proposed method includes a few modules. In detail, the first module (Reading) is used to read the 
malware datasets continuously and transfer them to feature selection modules. Then, the second module 
(Filtering) is responsible for normalizing the data and applying the feature selection algorithm to select the 
essential features for the proposed algorithm. After that, the third module (Splitting) is responsible for 
splitting the data into 70% training and 30% testing. Then, the fourth module (HP-ELM) is adapted to tune 
its parameters to predict the targets. Finally, the fifth module (Evaluation) is responsible for predicting the 
actual values in the training and testing phase. 
5.1. Feature selection  
 
Before applying the HP-ELM method, we utilized the F-Score  [36] and Fisher Score  [37] in order to select 
the most valuable features. Then, the HP-ELM builds to new data. The extracted features from CTU-13 
dataset are: {DstAddr, sport, Proto, SrcAddr, Dport, Dur, State, sTos, dTos, TotBytes, SrcBytes and 
TotPkts} [38] . More details about the features of CTU-13 mentioned in [20]. 
 
5.2. HP-ELM parameter setting (activation functions, number of neurons, etc) 
We applied six types of activation functions in the layer of HP-ELM such as linear, rbf-linf, rbf-l1, rbf-l1, 
tanh, and sigmoid. A total of 2000 of neurons applied in the layer of HP-ELM. We investigated HP-ELM 
with feature selection (Top 3, and top 5 features) and without feature selection (all features). We also applied 
 9 
 
different strategies for activation functions in the layer of HP-ELM (one, two, three and four activation 
functions) in both datasets. Finally, the state of the best answer recorded in the tables below.  
 
6. Performance Evaluation 
The following subsections describe in detail the pursued datasets, evaluation metrics, scenarios and their 
settings, and the results for the applied scenarios. 
6.1. Simulation Setup 
The methods tested on a system with Intel Core i7CPUand 8-GB RAM. Two benchmark malware datasets 
CTU-13 dataset (Scenario 5) [20] and DyHAP malware dataset [21] have been used to evaluate the 
performance of HP-ELM.  
 
6.2. Metrics 
This research used the accuracy ratio of Equation 8 to evaluate the performance of the method.  In general, 
the accuracy is the number of applications which the classifier correctly detects, divided by the total number 
of malicious and legitimate applications. The accuracy is between 0 and 1, i.e.  0 ≤ 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 ≤ 1 . We 
also have 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑇𝑃+𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑁+𝑇𝑁+𝐹𝑃
 (8)    
where the used parameters denote the following numbers.  TN is the accurately classified benign instances; 
TP is the malicious applications that are appropriately identified, FP is the wrongly classified benign 
instances as malware applications; and, FN is the malware instances wrongly classified as a legitimate 
application. 
7. Results and discussion 
We evaluated the results using various layers with/without the feature selection. 
7.1. Evaluate HP-ELM without applying feature selection in android malware 
 
This subsection compared the performance of the HP-ELM in the presence of various active functions for 
two datasets without using feature selections and integrated all features. A total number of 13 features are 
available in CTU-13 dataset, and the number of total input features for Android Malware dataset is 6.  Table 
1 shows the accuracy rate of HP-ELM in training (70%) and testing (30%). Table 1 shows that the HP-ELM 
reach a high accuracy of 0.9696 in training and 0.9672 in testing with 2000 neurons of Rbf-linf activation 
function without applying the feature selection. The result indicates that the accuracy of HP-ELM increased 
with two activation functions (Rbf_linf(1000), Sigmoid(1000)). Finally, the accuracy of HP-ELM with three 
activation functions Sigmoid (400), Tanh (1000), Rbf_linf(600), and a total number of 2000 neurons reach  
0.9679 in training and 0.9661 in testing.  
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TABLE 1  
The accuracy rate of the HP-ELM method with different active functions and without feature selection for training and test data of Malware 
datasets 
 
Priority of Feature  One Activation Function Accuracy Ratio (%) 
Train Data Test Data 
70% 30% 
All Features [0 5 6 4 2 3 1] Linear (2000) 0.7087 0.7095 
Rbf_l1 (2000) 0.9694 0.9669 
Tanh (2000) 0.9654 0.9636 
Sigmoid (2000) 0.9657 0.9637 
Rbf_l2 (2000) 0.9678 0.9653 
Rbf_linf(2000) 0.9696 0.9672 
 Two Activation Function Train Data Test Data 
All Features [0 5 6 4 2 3 1] Sigmoid (1000), Linear (1000),  0.9589 0.9581 
Rbf_l2(1000), Linear (1000) 0.9613 0.9594 
Rbf_l1 (1000), Sigmoid (1000) 0.9680 0.9659 
Tanh (1000), Rbf_l1(1000) 0.9679 0.9662 
Sigmoid (1000), Tanh (1000) 0.9664 0.9638 
Rbf_linf(1000), Sigmoid(1000) 0.9689 0.9673 
 Three Activation Function Train Data Test Data 
All Features [0 5 6 4 2 3 1] Tanh (750), Rbf_linf(250), Linear (1000) 0.9610 0.9593 
Tanh (1000), Rbf_linf(550),  Linear (450) 0.9648 0.9635 
Sigmoid (400), Tanh (1000), 
Rbf_linf(600), 
0.9679 0.9661 
 
Figure 4 (a, b) indicates the accuracy of HP-ELM with and without feature selection with one, two and three 
activation function for android malware dataset. The x-axis represents the activation function’s name. For example, 
the order of one activation function with all features are linear, Rbf_l1, Tanh, Sigmoid, Rbf_l2 and Rbf_linf which 
are mapped to the tag point (0.0, 0.5,1.0,1.5,2.0,2.5,3.0,3.5,4.0).   
 
Fig 4 (a). Accuracy of HP-ELM without feature selection with one 
activation function for android malware dataset 
 
Fig 4 (b). Accuracy of HP-ELM without feature selection with 
Two activation function for android malware dataset 
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7.2. Evaluate HP-ELM by applying feature selection (Top 3 features) on android malware 
This subsection compares the performance of the HP-ELM in the presence of various active functions for the 
android malware datasets with three higher priority features using F-Score selection policy. The goal of this scenario 
is to analyze the accuracy rate of the HP-ELM method in the presence of different activation functions using various 
selected features. In Table 2, we have numerically tested this, by applying the top 3 features, the accuracy of HP-
ELM in terms of one activation function Rbf_l1(2000) reach a high value of 0.9056 in training and 0.9017 in testing. 
On the other hand, a combination of two activation functions such as Tanh (1000), Rbf_l1(1000) Hp-elm gives a 
better accuracy ratio of 0.9018 in testing. Finally, the high accuracy reached with three activation function Sigmoid 
(400), Tanh (1000), Rbf_linf(600) in testing 0.8998. It can be considered the best strategy rule of a two-activation 
function. 
TABLE 2  
The accuracy rate of the HP-ELM method with different active functions and different priority of feature (with feature selection) for training and test data of 
Malware datasets (Top 3 feature)  
 
Priority of 
Feature 
One Activation Function Accuracy Ratio (%) 
Train Data Test Data 
70% 30% 
Top 3 
Features  
[0 5 6] 
Linear (2000) 0.6928 0.6923 
Sigmoid (2000) 0.8941 0.8918 
Tanh (2000) 0.9017 0.8975 
Rbf_l1 (2000) 0.9056 0.9017 
Rbf_l2 (2000) 0.8873 0.8853 
Rbf_linf (2000) 0.9023 0.8978 
 Two Activation Function Train Data Test Data 
Top 3 
Features 
[0 5 6] 
Sigmoid (1000), Linear (1000), 0.8880 0.8846 
Sigmoid (1000), Tanh (1000) 0.9007 0.8968 
Tanh (1000), Rbf_l1(1000) 0.9058 0.9016 
Rbf_l1 (1000), Sigmoid (1000) 0.9046 0.9018 
Rbf_l2(1000), Linear (1000) 0.8843 0.8824 
Rbf_linf(1000), Sigmoid(1000) 0.8995 0.8946 
 Three Activation Function Train Data Test Data 
Top 3 
Features  
[0 5 6] 
Sigmoid (400), Tanh (1000), Rbf_linf(600), 0.9037 0.8998 
Tanh (1000), Rbf_linf(550),Linear (450) 0.8993 0.8963 
Tanh (750), Rbf_linf(250), Linear (1000) 0.8909 0.8883 
 
Figure 5a, and 5b indicate the accuracy of HP-ELM in android malware scenario.  
 
Fig 5 (a). Accuracy of HP-ELM with top 3 features and two 
activation function for android malware dataset 
 
Fig 5 (b). Accuracy of HP-ELM with top 3 feature with three 
activation function for android malware dataset 
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7.3. Evaluate HP-ELM with applying feature selection (Top 5 features) on android malware 
This subsection compares the performance of the HP-ELM in the presence of various active functions for the same 
layer for android malware datasets with five higher priority features using F-Score selection policy. The goal of this 
scenario is to analyze the accuracy rate of the HP-ELM method in the presence of different activation functions 
using various selected features. In Table 3, we have numerically tested this, by applying top 5 features, the accuracy 
of HP-ELM in terms of one activation function Rbf_linf (2000) reach to the high value of 0.9675 in training and 
0.9656 in testing. However, the testing result of Rbf_l1 (2000) is higher than Rbf_linf (2000), which is 0.9702.  
TABLE 3  
The accuracy rate of the HP-ELM method with different active functions and different priority of feature (with feature selection) for training and test data of 
Malware datasets (Top 5 features)  
 
Priority of 
Feature 
One Activation Function Accuracy Ratio (%) 
Train Data Test Data 
70% 30% 
Top 5 
Features 
 [0 5 6 4 2] 
Linear (2000) 0.7009 0.7019 
Sigmoid (2000) 0.9663 0.9642 
Tanh (2000) 0.9651 0.9644 
Rbf_l1 (2000) 0.9713 0.9702 
Rbf_l2 (2000) 0.9633 0.9622 
Rbf_linf (2000) 0.9675 0.9656 
 Two Activation Function Train Data Test Data 
Top 5 
Features 
 [0 5 6 4 2] 
Sigmoid (1000), Linear (1000),  0.9583 0.9578 
Sigmoid (1000), Tanh (1000) 0.9660 0.9643 
Tanh (1000), Rbf_l1(1000) 0.9693 0.9683 
Rbf_l1 (1000), Sigmoid (1000) 0.9707 0.9689 
Rbf_l2(1000), Linear (1000) 0.9608 0.9610 
Rbf_linf(1000), Sigmoid(1000) 0.9673 0.9654 
 Three Activation Function Train Data Test Data 
Top 5 
Features 
 [0 5 6 4 2] 
Sigmoid (400), Tanh (1000), Rbf_linf(600) 0.9668 0.9661 
Tanh (1000), Rbf_linf(550),Linear (450) 0.9635 0.9616 
Tanh (750), Rbf_linf(250), Linear (1000) 0.9583 0.9572 
 
Although, the result of a combination of two activation functions Rbf_linf (1000), Sigmoid (1000), Hp-elm gives a 
better accuracy ratio of 0.9673 in training and 0.9654 in testing, but the combination of two activation functions of 
Rbf_l1 (1000), Sigmoid (1000) reaches a high accuracy in testing phase which is equal to 0.9689.  The combination 
of three activation functions such as Sigmoid (400), Tanh (1000), Rbf_linf(600), gives the accuracy of 0.9668 in 
training and 0.9661 in testing which is not very high in comparison with the cases of two and one activation 
functions. 
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Fig 6 (a). Accuracy of HP-ELM with top 5 features and one 
activation function for android malware dataset 
 
Fig 6 (b). Accuracy of HP-ELM with top 5 features and two 
activation function for android malware dataset 
 
In Figure 6, we confirm that when the number of activation function increases, the accuracy will also increase, and 
its value will remain constant after 1000 neurons in datasets. By increasing the number of activation (two) functions, 
the highest accuracy reached in the testing phase. 
 
TABLE 4  
The accuracy rate of the HP-ELM method without feature selection and different active functions in training and test data of CTU-13 datasets  
 
Priority of 
Feature 
Activation Function Accuracy Ratio (%) 
CTU-13 Dataset (Scenario 5) 
Train Data Test Data 
70% 30%  
One activation function 
Features 
[3  7  1  4  6  2  5  
0 12  9 11 10  8] 
Linear (2000) 0.3095 0.3144 
Rbf_l1 (2000) 0.9599 0.9563 
Tanh (2000) 0.9635 0.9597 
Sigmoid (2000) 0.9637 0.9592 
Rbf_l2 (2000) 0.9654 0.9603 
Rbf_linf(2000) 0.9650 0.9625 
 
 
Features 
[3  7  1  4  6  2  5  
0 12  9 11 10  8] 
Two activation function 
Tanh (1000), Sigm(1000) 0.9631 0.9596 
Tanh (1000),  rbf_l1 (1000) 0.9621 0.9600 
Tanh (1000),  rbf_l2 (1000) 0.9636 0.9603 
Tanh (1000),  rbf_linf (1000) 0.9639 0.9621 
Tanh (1000),    linear (1000) 0.9614 0.9596 
Sigm(1000), rbf_l1(1000) 0.9621 0.9596 
Sigm(1000), rbf_l2(1000) 0.9641 0.9604 
Sigm(1000), rbf_linf(1000) 0.9639 0.9615 
Sigm(1000), linear(1000) 0.9609 0.9588 
rbf_l1(1000), rbf_l2(1000) 0.9622 0.9598 
rbf_l1(1000), rbf_linf(1000) 0.9642 0.9622 
rbf_l1(1000), linear(1000) 0.9575 0.9558 
rbf_l2(1000), rbf_linf(1000) 0.9645 0.9619 
rbf_l2(1000), linear(1000) 0.9615 0.9592 
rbf_linf(1000), linear(1000) 0.9625 0.9606 
 Three activation function 
Features 
[3  7  1  4  6  2  5  
0 12  9 11 10  8] 
Tanh(666), sigm(667), rbf_l1(667) 0.9621 0.9593 
Tanh(666), sigm(667), rbf_l2(667) 0.9633 0.9598 
Tanh(666), sigm(667), rbf_linf(667) 0.9642 0.9616 
Tanh(666), sigm(667), linear(667) 0.9619 0.9594 
Sigm(666), rbf_l1(667), rbf_l2(667) 0.9623 0.9596 
Sigm(666), rbf_l1(667), rbf_linf(667) 0.9641 0.9616 
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Sigm(666), rbf_l1(667), Linear(667) 0.9615 0.9595 
rbf_l1(666), rbf_l12(667), rbf_linf(667) 0.9638 0.9616 
rbf_l1(666), rbf_l12(667), linear (667) 0.9611 0.9591 
rbf_l2(666), rbf_linf(667), linear(667) 0.9626 0.9605 
Four activation function 
Features 
[3  7  1  4  6  2  5  
0 12  9 11 10  8] 
Tanh(500), sigm(500), rbf_11(500), rbf_12(500) 0.9630 0.9603 
Tanh(500), sigm(500), rbf_11(500), rbf_linf (500) 0.9633 0.9610 
Tanh(500), sigm(500), rbf_11(500),    linear (500) 0.9619 0.9596 
sigm(500), rbf_11(500), rbf_12(500),  rbf_linf 
(500) 
0.9633 0.9611 
sigm(500), rbf_11(500), rbf_12(500),    linear (500) 0.9615 0.9590 
rbf_11(500), rbf_12(500),  rbf_linf (500)    linear 
(500) 
0.9619 0.9599 
 
7.4. Evaluate HP-ELM without applying feature selection on CTU-13 
 
HP-ELM applied to CTU-13 in training and test cases. For example, with one activation function (Rbf_linf) with 
2000 neurons reaches a high accuracy of classification of 0.9625 in testing. On the other hand, the higher accuracy 
with two activation functions rbf_l1(1000), rbf_linf(1000) is 0.9622 in the testing phase. By increasing the number 
of activation functions to three, the result does not reach as high accuracy in comparison with one and two activation 
functions. The highest accuracy with three activation functions is 0.9616 which is lower than 0.9625 obtained with 
one activation function and 0.9622 obtained with two activation function.  
 
 
Fig 7 (a). Accuracy of HP-ELM without feature selection and one 
activation function for CUT-13 
 
 
Fig 7 (b). Accuracy of HP-ELM without feature selection and 
Two activation function for CUT-13 
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Fig 7 (c). Accuracy of HP-ELM without feature selection and 
Three activation function for CUT-13 
Fig 7 (d). Accuracy of HP-ELM without feature selection and 
Four activation function for CUT-13 
 
 
According to Figures 7 (a) ,7 (b) and 7(c) for the CTU-13 dataset, it is confirmed that more activation functions 
provide more complexities. It observed that the rate does not increase. Moreover, when we reach to the best number 
of neurons, increasing activation functions does not affect the accuracy in comparison with the case of one activation 
function in the layer of HP-ELM.  
 
7.5. Evaluate HP-ELM with applying feature selection on CTU-13 (Top 3) 
In this section, the feature selection strategy applied to CTU-13. Therefore, three high priority features are selected 
based on the F-score algorithm, then the selected feature allows hp-elm to evaluate the performance of the method. 
As in previous sections, various activation functions with a total number of 2000 neurons applied to CTU-13. 
TABLE 5 
The accuracy rate of the HP-ELM method with feature selection and different active functions in training and test data of CTU-13 datasets (Top 3 features)  
 
Priority of Feature Activation Function Accuracy Ratio (%) 
CTU-13 Dataset (Scenario 5) 
Train Data Test Data 
70% 30% 
 
One activation function 
Features [3  7  1 ] Linear (2000) 0.5473 0.5440 
Rbf_l1 (2000) 0.9585 0.9564 
Tanh (2000) 0.9593 0.9566 
Sigmoid (2000) 0.9585 0.9566 
Rbf_l2 (2000) 0.9575 0.9559 
Rbf_linf(2000) 0.9611 0.9592 
 
Features [3  7  1 ] 
Two activation function 
Tanh (1000), Sigm(1000) 0.9593 0.9570 
Tanh (1000),  rbf_l1 (1000) 0.9598 0.9578 
Tanh (1000),  rbf_l2 (1000) 0.9591 0.9569 
Tanh (1000),  rbf_linf (1000) 0.9605 0.9578 
Tanh (1000), linear (1000) 0.9593 0.9572 
Sigm(1000), rbf_l1(1000) 0.9596 0.9581 
Sigm(1000), rbf_l2(1000) 0.9584 0.9566 
Sigm(1000), rbf_linf(1000) 0.9601 0.9579 
Sigm(1000), linear(1000) 0.9581 0.9564 
rbf_l1(1000), rbf_l2(1000) 0.9585 0.9563 
rbf_l1(1000), rbf_linf(1000) 0.9608 0.9588 
rbf_l1(1000), linear (1000) 0.9571 0.9551 
rbf_l2(1000), rbf_linf(1000) 0.9598 0.9580 
rbf_l2(1000), linear (1000) 0.9574 0.9559 
rbf_linf(1000), linear(1000) 0.9596 0.9572 
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 Three activation function 
Features [3  7  1 ] Tanh(666), sigm(667), rbf_11(667) 0.9595 0.9577 
Tanh(666), sigm(667), rbf_12(667) 0.9590 0.9571 
Tanh(666), sigm(667), rbf_linf(667) 0.9598 0.9576 
Tanh(666), sigm(667), linear(667) 0.9590 0.9572 
Sigm(666), rbf_11(667), rbf_12(667) 0.9587 0.9569 
Sigm(666), rbf_11(667), rbf_linf(667) 0.9607 0.9589 
Sigm(666), rbf_11(667), Linear(667) 0.9586 0.9566 
rbf_11(666), rbf_l12(667), rbf_linf(667) 0.9603 0.9581 
rbf_11(666), rbf_l12(667), linear(667) 0.9581 0.9557 
rbf_12(666), rbf_linf(667), linear(667) 0.9593 0.9576 
Four activation function 
Features [3  7  1 ] Tanh(500), sigm(500), rbf_11(500), rbf_12(500) 0.9590 0.9571 
Tanh(500), sigm(500), rbf_11(500), rbf_linf (500) 0.9605 0.9582 
Tanh(500), sigm(500), rbf_11(500),    linear (500) 0.9591 0.9573 
sigm(500), rbf_11(500), rbf_12(500),  rbf_linf 
(500) 
0.9596 0.9576 
sigm(500), rbf_11(500), rbf_12(500),    linear (500) 0.9583 0.9563 
rbf_11(500), rbf_12(500),  rbf_linf (500)    linear 
(500) 
0.9595 0.9574 
 
Table 5 shows the best accuracy with three activation function is 0.9589 in testing phase. 
 
 
Fig 8 (a). Accuracy of HP-ELM with feature selection and one 
activation function for CUT-13 
 
 
Fig 8 (b). Accuracy of HP-ELM with feature selection and two 
activation function for CUT-13 
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Fig 8 (c). Accuracy of HP-ELM with feature selection and three 
activation function for CUT-13 
 
Fig 8 (d). Accuracy of HP-ELM with feature selection and four 
activation function for CUT-13 
 
 
On the other hand, the highest accuracy with one activation function (Rbf-linf) reaches 0.9592 in the testing phase.  
Figure 8 (a,b,c) shows the accuracy of hp-elm with the top 3 features and different activation functions. 
7.6. Evaluate HP-ELM with applying feature selection on CTU-13 (Top 5) 
 
In this scenario, five high priority features are selected based on the F-score algorithm. By applying one activation 
function with a total number of 2000 of neurons, high accuracy of 0.9589 in Rbf_linf (2000) is reached in the testing 
phase as shown in Table 6. 
TABLE 6 
The accuracy rate of the HP-ELM method with feature selection and different active functions in training and test data of CTU-13 datasets (Top 5 features) 
Priority of Feature Activation Function Accuracy Ratio (%) 
CTU-13 Dataset (Scenario 5) 
Train Data Test Data 
70% 30%  
One activation function 
Features [3  7  1  4  6] Linear (2000) 0.4399 0.4399 
Rbf_l1 (2000) 0.9600 0.9570 
Tanh (2000) 0.9622 0.9564 
Sigmoid (2000) 0.9610 0.9578 
Rbf_l2 (2000) 0.9603 0.9585 
Rbf_linf(2000) 0.9616 0.9589 
 
Features [3  7  1  4  6] 
Two activation function 
Tanh (1000), Sigm(1000) 0.9619 0.9577 
Tanh (1000),  rbf_11 (1000) 0.9616 0.9576 
Tanh (1000),  rbf_12 (1000) 0.9612 0.9582 
Tanh (1000),  rbf_linf (1000) 0.9616 0.9581 
Tanh (1000),    linear (1000) 0.9606 0.9584 
Sigm(1000), rbf_11(1000) 0.9615 0.9583 
Sigm(1000), rbf_12(1000) 0.9607 0.9580 
Sigm(1000), rbf_linf(1000) 0.9613 0.9576 
Sigm(1000), linear(1000) 0.9606 0.9581 
rbf_11(1000), rbf_12(1000) 0.9608 0.9586 
rbf_11(1000), rbf_linf(1000) 0.9612 0.9586 
rbf_11(1000), linear(1000) 0.9569 0.9548 
rbf_12(1000), rbf_linf(1000) 0.9611 0.9588 
rbf_12(1000), linear(1000) 0.9603 0.9585 
rbf_linf(1000), linear(1000) 0.9605 0.9590 
 Three activation function 
Features [3  7  1  4  6] Tanh(666), sigm(667), rbf_11(667) 0.9615 0.9576 
Tanh(666), sigm(667), rbf_12(667) 0.9613 0.9577 
Tanh(666), sigm(667), rbf_linf(667) 0.9616 0.9577 
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Tanh(666), sigm(667), linear(667) 0.9609 0.9581 
Sigm(666), rbf_11(667), rbf_12(667) 0.9612 0.9582 
Sigm(666), rbf_11(667), rbf_linf(667) 0.9614 0.9581 
Sigm(666), rbf_11(667), Linear(667) 0.9607 0.9582 
rbf_11(666), rbf_l12(667), rbf_linf(667) 0.9615 0.9588 
rbf_11(666), rbf_l12(667), linear(667) 0.9604 0.9583 
rbf_12(666), rbf_linf(667), linear(667) 0.9606 0.9586 
Four activation function 
Features [3  7  1  4  6] Tanh(500), sigm(500), rbf_11(500), rbf_12(500) 0.9614 0.9579 
Tanh(500), sigm(500), rbf_11(500), rbf_linf (500) 0.9616 0.9585 
Tanh(500), sigm(500), rbf_11(500),    linear (500) 0.9613 0.9582 
sigm(500), rbf_11(500), rbf_12(500),  rbf_linf 
(500) 
0.9611 0.9583 
sigm(500), rbf_11(500), rbf_12(500),    linear (500) 0.9608 0.9585 
rbf_11(500), rbf_12(500),  rbf_linf (500)    linear 
(500) 
0.9606 0.9585 
 
The second-highest accuracy with two activation function of rbf_linf(1000), linear(1000) is 0.9590 in the 
testing phase. On the other hand, the third highest accuracy with three activation function rbf_11(666), 
rbf_l12(667), rbf_linf (667) is 0.9588 in testing phase. By increasing the number of activation functions to 
four, the accuracy of 0.9585 is the same in the testing phase for the activation function of 1) Tanh(500), 
sigm(500), rbf_11(500), rbf_linf (500) 2) sigm(500), rbf_l1(500), rbf_l2(500), linear (500) and 3) 
rbf_l1(500), rbf_l2(500),  rbf_linf (500) linear (500), but the training phase of Tanh(500), sigm(500), 
rbf_11(500), rbf_linf (500) is better than the rest of the activation functions. 
 
Fig 9 (a). Accuracy of HP-ELM with feature selection and 
one activation function for CUT-13 
 
 
Fig 9 (b). Accuracy of HP-ELM with feature selection and two 
activation function for CUT-13 
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Fig 9 (c). Accuracy of HP-ELM with feature selection and 
three activation function for CUT-13 
 
 
Fig 9 (d). Accuracy of HP-ELM with feature selection and four 
activation function for CUT-13 
 
7.7. Comparison of results 
 
For the evaluation of a proposed model, the key point is to show that the HP-ELM model is producing the 
smallest error in testing datasets or the highest accuracy of classification. As Table 7 shows, the accuracy 
values for malware dataset without feature selection are rather high with two activation function Rbf_linf 
(1000), and Sigmoid (1000). From Table 8 with feature selection, it is apparent that the precision is rather 
high in terms of two activation function of Rbf_l1 (1000) and Sigmoid (1000) compared with other metrics. 
Table 9 and 10 show the evaluation of the proposed method on CTU-13 with and without feature selection. 
The outcome of Table 9 and 10 indicate that the higher accuracy of HP-ELM in CTU-13 without feature 
selection is 0.9625 in the testing phase which is related to one activation function Rbf_linf(2000). On the 
other hand, the best accuracy of feature selection based on HP-ELM for top 3 is 0.9592 which is 
Rbf_linf(2000) and the higher accuracy for top 5 feature in testing is 0.9590 which is rbf_linf(1000), 
linear(1000).  
 
 
 
Table 7: Accuracy of HP-ELM without feature selection in malware dataset  
Without feature selection 
Dataset #Activation function All features    
Training Testing 
Malware  1 activation function Rbf_linf(2000) 0.9696 0.9672 
2 activation function Rbf_linf(1000), Sigmoid(1000) 0.9689 0.9673 
3 activation function  Sigmoid (400), Tanh (1000), Rbf_linf(600), 0.9679 0.9661 
 
Table 8: Accuracy of HP-ELM with feature selection in malware dataset 
  
With feature selection 
Dataset #Activation function Top 3 #Activation function Top 5  
 
 
Trainin
g 
Testin
g 
 
Trainin
g 
Testing 
 1 activation 
function 
Rbf_l1 (2000) 0.9056 0.901
7 
Rbf_linf (2000) 0.9675 0.9656 
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Malwa
re 
2 activation 
function 
Rbf_l1 (1000), Sigmoid 
(1000) 
0.9046 0.901
8 
Rbf_l1 (1000), Sigmoid 
(1000) 
0.9707 0.9689 
3 activation 
function 
Sigmoid (400), Tanh 
(1000), Rbf_linf(600) 
0.9037 0.899
8 
Sigmoid (400), Tanh 
(1000), Rbf_linf(600) 
0.9668 0.9661 
 
The Table 7 and 8 reports summarize information on the total number of evaluations in malware dataset which 
gained accuracy for HP-ELM in two experiments, with and without feature selection, which specifically focus on 
the number of activation functions. In the feature selection experiment, the total numbers of activation functions 
remained the same, but there was a significant difference in the accuracy of classification by increasing the number 
of feature selection. For instance, the accuracy of testing (0.9689) in the top 5 feature is higher than the accuracy of 
classification (0.9018) with the top 3 feature selection in the same activation function and the number of neurons. 
As shown in Table 8, in malware experiments with three activation functions, out of a total of 2000 neuron, the 
percentage of accuracy in top 5 feature was higher. In general, it can be seen that by increasing the number of 
activation functions without feature selection strategy, the percentage of accuracy is gradually dropping. On the 
other hand, by selecting more features and activation functions, the accuracy of classification increases moderately. 
Table 9: Accuracy of HP-ELM without feature selection in CTU-13 dataset  
#Activation function Without feature selection 
Dataset   Train Test 
 
 
CTU-13 
1 activation function Rbf_linf(2000) 0.965 0.9625 
2 activation function rbf_l1(1000), rbf_linf(1000) 0.9642 0.9622 
3 activation function  Tanh (666), sigm(667), rbf_linf(667) 0.9642 0.9616 
4 activation function sigm(500), rbf_11(500), rbf_12(500),  rbf_linf (500) 0.9633 0.9611 
 
Table 10: Accuracy of HP-ELM with feature selection in CTU-13 dataset  
With feature selection 
#Activation function Top 3 #Act function Top 5 
CTU-13 Train Test 
 
Train Test 
1 act function Rbf_lin 
f(2000) 
 
0.961
1 
0.959
2 
Rbf_linf 
(2000) 
0.961
6 
0.958
9 
2 act function rbf_l1 
(1000), rbf_linf(1000) 
0.960
8 
0.958
8 
rbf_linf 
(1000), linear(1000) 
0.960
5 
0.959
0 
3 act  function Sigm(666), rbf_11(667), rbf_linf(667) 0.960
7 
0.958
9 
rbf_11(666), rbf_l12(667), rbf_linf(667) 0.961
5 
0.958
8 
4 activation 
function 
Tanh (500), sigm(500), rbf_11(500), rbf_linf 
(500) 
0.960
5 
0.958
2 
Tanh (500), sigm(500), rbf_11(500), rbf_linf 
(500) 
0.961
6 
0.958
5 
 
Table 9 and 10 gives information on the accuracy of classification of HP-ELM for two experiments, with and 
without feature selection of CTU-13 dataset. In the feature selection experiment, HP-ELM was the highest accuracy 
leader with a low number of feature selection, and it is about 0.9592 for the top 3 features with one activation 
function.  
8. Conclusion and future discussion  
 
In this paper, we exploit HP-ELM to improve prediction stability for the training of (SLFNs). The presented model 
optimizes the input weights and hidden layers and provides more consistent performance in comparison to the other 
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training models. Actual performance of the HP-ELM classifier tested under two real-world datasets, with various 
activation functions, neurons, layers, and different feature selections. The simulation results show that HP-ELM is 
a fast training method that reduces the root mean square error near to zero, it approaches accuracy ratio to one, and 
it achieves the feature optimization combination, and it also provides an excellent generalization performance on 
an SLFN and establishes a network intrusion detection model with the best overall performance. This finding, 
however, shows that despite promising results obtained by using the proposed model for this case study, it improved 
and further studies, which take more variables into account, will need to be undertaken.  
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